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Intelligence agency implicated in Munir's murder 
As the first phase of investigations into the murder of Indonesia's foremost human rights activist, 
Munir, draws to a close, more evidence has emerged linking the country's intelligence agency, BIN, to 
the murder. The focus of attention is a high-ranking, retired army officer who was head of the agency 
at the time of the murder. Information has also come to light that the conspirators had considered 
several ways of killing Munir. So far only one person has been arrested. 
The conspiracy that led to the murder of Munir last 
September has continued to provoke widespread condem-
nation across the world while in Indonesia, on-going inves-
tigations have been extensively reported in the media. The 
Fact-Finding Team set up by presidential decision to 
conduct investigations ended its six-month mandate on 23 
June. It has produced a 100-page report which has been 
presented to President. Members of the Team said that the 
report would not be made public. 
RLA Laureates mourn Munir's death 
The tragedy was the focus of attention at the 25th 
Anniversary in June of the Right Livelihood Award when 
Laureates from around the world paid tribute to Munir who 
received the award in 2000. His widow, Suciwati, attended 
the gathering held in Salzburg, Austria as a guest of honour. 
She arrived in Salzburg straight from Washington D.C. 
where she spoke to members of the US Congress. In 
Salzburg, she was interviewed extensively by Austrian and 
international media. 
In a statement to the Laureates, Suciwati said: 
'I want to raise the matter of the death of my husband, 
Munir, a human rights activist, who died on board a Garuda 
plane from a lethal dose of arsenic. He was poisoned 
because of his human rights activities. Many death threats 
were made against him, but they were never taken seriously. 
There were at least seven bomb threats, including two 
against our home and one against his office, as well as a 
physical attack by a group of thugs and militias. Only one 
of these incidents was ever taken to court. This shows that 
he was a target and that this was a political murder. ' 
The RLA Laureates adopted a declaration in the form of 
a letter addressed to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
calling on him to ensure that the on-going investigations 
into the murder 'of our fellow Laureate, Munir, lead to the 
disclosure of the true perpetrators of his murder and to 
ensure that those persons are brought to justice without 
delay.' The letter expressed concern that Indonesia's judi-
cial authorities may not take account of the findings of the 
Fact-Finding Team set up in Indonesia, nor will the nature 
of the conspiracy be uncovered 'which the fact-finding team 
identified as going to the heart of military intelligence'. 
'This is not just a question of justice for Munir and his 
family but is also vital for the protection of the whole 
human rights community in Indonesia,' the letter said. 
When Laureates, Angie Zelter of the UK and Carmel 
Budiardjo of the UK and Indonesia, contacted the 
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Indonesian embassy in Vienna with a request for an 
appointment to deliver the letter, embassy officials made it 
clear that it would not be possible to arrange a meeting. 
High-level obstructions 
The Fact-Finding Team was set up last December for a 
three-month period which was extended for a further three 
months. Its assignment was to assist the police with regard 
to the case. After months of intensive interviews with many 
people, the team came to the conclusion that there were 
three layers to the murder conspiracy: the person or persons 
who executed the murder, high-ranking officials of Garuda, 
the national airline, and agents oflndonesia's military intel-
ligence, BIN. The investigations were conducted with 
strong endorsement from the President who issued instruc-
tions to all state agencies to collaborate fully with the fact-
finding team. 
When members of the Team met President Yudhoyono 
on 24 June to deliver their report, the President told them 
that he was committed to bringing the perpetrators of the 
crime to justice. After meeting the President, Team member, 
Usman Hamid said the Team had recommended that the 
President put pressure on the Police and BIN to co-operate 
with the investigations. 'We do not doubt the President but 
it remains a question whether government institutions 
(under the President) support his efforts,' said Usman. 
The investigations ran smoothly until the final stage 
when the Team issued a summons to retired army officer, Lt 
General Hendropriyono who was head of BIN at the time of 
the murder. Under Megawati Sukarnoputri, who was 
President of Indonesia at the time, Hendropriyono as head 
of BIN was accorded the unusual privilege of being a 
member of her cabinet. 
However, Hendropriyono took strong exception to the 
Team and refused to comply with its request to appear for 
questioning. He accused the team of 'arrogance' and _'char-
acter assassination'; he alleged that they had acted impo-
litely to a person of his position. He also filed a complaint 
to the police about two members of the Team. 
His lawyer, Syamsu Djalal, did not mince words in his 
contempt for the investigations. He said: 'Who ~s this Munir 
anyway that a presidential regulation had 'l:o be issued? A lot 
of people die but no regulations are made for them.' 
Suspect arrested 
As a result of the Team's investigations, three suspects 
have so far been named one of whom is now under arrest. 
' . They are all Garuda employees. The arreste? . man is 
Pollycarpus, a Garuda pilot who came ~nder suspic~on. fr?m 
the start because he had been issued with a special aviation 
security' assignment' to travel on Flight 974. He tra.velled on 
the flight for the first leg only, from Jakarta to Singapore. 
According to Munir's widow, Pollycarpus made several 
phone calls to their home, to check on his flight plans. 
When the passengers boarded the aircraft in Jakarta, 
Pollycarpus offered Munir his seat in business class 
although Munir was travelling economy class. 
It is understood that Pollycarpus will be charged with 
being an accomplice to murder, and of forgery and conspir-
acy. The other two suspects who are not under arrest are 
both flight attendants who served Munir with food or drink. 
Munir died on 7 September last year on board Garuda flight 
974 from Jakarta to Amsterdam. An autopsy conducted by 
Dutch forensic experts after his arrival in the Netherlands 
found that he had been poisoned with a lethal dose of 
arsenic. The poison was added to a drink that he was served 
on the first leg of the flight from Jakarta to Singapore. Soon 
after leaving Singapore, Munir was stricken with severe 
vomiting and diarrhoea. A doctor in board who was a 
passenger gave him something to calm him, not realising 
the gravity of his condition. Shortly before the plane wad 
due to land, a stewardess approached him on a seat near the 
toilet, only to discover that he was dead. 
Communications with BIN 
Head of the Fact-Finding Team, Police Brigadier-
General Marsudhi Hanafi said they did not believe that 
Pollycarpus had poisoned Munir. 'He only opened the door.' 
The Team had examined the cell phone of Pollycarpus 
and had traced several dialled numbers, one of which was a 
confidential line inside the office of retired Major-General 
Muchdi Purwoprajoyo, who was BIN deputy director for 
agent moblisation. Records showed that as many as 26 calls 
had been made to Muchdi, before and after Munir's death 
and that multiple calls had been placed to Pollycarpus from 
Muchdi's personal mobile number. Muchdi was formerly a 
head of Kopassus, the army's special forces. He recently 
resigned from BIN, and declined two requests from the 
Fact-Finding Team to appear for questioning. He has denied 
that he had made calls to Pollycarpus and said alleged that 
his phone may have been used by someone else. 
The Team also gained access to an internal security 
agency document which listed several plots to murder 
Munir, including the use of sorcery. The mid-air method 
was one of the listed plots. According to Marsudhi Hanafi, 
the document assigned specific teams for each of the plots. 
Another former army officer who the Team wanted to 
question is Colonel Bambang Irawan, a retired special 
forces officer who has been identified by a witness as 
having been on the aircraft, although his name did not 
appear on the passenger list. According to Hanafi, Irawan 
has been identified as a BIN operative. 
Now up to the police 
The Fact-Finding Team has clearly contributed hugely to 
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investigating the murder of Indonesia's foremost human 
rights activist. When the president's decision to set up such 
a team was announced, several senior human rights activists 
expressed reservations because of the limited nature of its 
mandate and refused to participate. However, the Team has 
shown that it pursued the case with great determination, 
delving into highly sensitive areas which members of the 
police force might have tried to avoid because of the likely 
military involvement in the crime. Headed by a former 
senior police detective and composed of several well-
known human rights activists, it has succeeded in drawing 
attention to the political nature of the crime. 
Intelligence supremo General Hendro Priyono enjoyed 
a special relationship with former President Megawati 
There was no question of its trying to prolong its mandate 
which would probably not have been possible anyway. The 
Team appears to have taken its investigations as far as they 
could go and has asked the President to set up an oversight 
group to monitor the conduct of the police, in whose hands 
the case now rests. 
Impunity must no~ prevail . 
With so much information about the murder now m the 
public domain, it is up to the police to identify the person or 
persons who masterminded this evil c.rime and to lay formal 
charges against them as soon as possible. 
Munir's lifework was dedicated to fighting the impunity 
which so many members of the armed forces have enjoyed 
throughout the years of the Suharto dictatorship and since. 
It would be irony indeed if the men who plotted his murder 
should now be allowed to go free while lower-ranking 
accomplices take the rap. 
When announcing the establishment of the Fact-Finding 
Team President Yudhoyono described this as a 'test case' 
for Iddonesia. If the guilty men are brought to justice, this 
will certainly enhance his reputation and be an important 
sign that in Indonesia today, the rule of law is not empty 
h . * r etonc. 
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continued from page 4 
intended to distract attention from a local corruption case or 
to destabilise local elections due to be held in June. The 
more likely explanation however is that those responsible 
were intent upon using acts of terrorism to create the 
impression that the government of Susilo Bamban.g 
Yudhoyono is not in control, and where better to do this 
than in a region that has a history of communal discord? 
According to General Da'i Bachtiar, Indonesia's chief of 
police, recent intelligence suggests that groups conn.ected 
with Azahari have drawn up plans to carry out a senes of 
bombing outrages in the near future. [Tempo, 5 June 2005] 
While the police have detained fourteen people believed to 
have been involved in the latest bombings, the government 
has been criticised for failing to take action to bring the situ-
ation in Central Sulawesi under control. 
Some facts about Sulawesi 
The oddly-shaped island is slightly smaller in size than 
Great Britain. It was the scene of fighting from 1999-2001 
that killed 2,000 people around an area in the Central 
Sulawesi district of Poso, 1,500 km (900 miles) northeast of 
Jakarta. Tentena lies in the centre of the district. A peace 
deal was agreed in late 2001. There has been sporadic 
violence ever since, but the attacks on 28 May were the 
worst since the accord. 
Like other parts of eastern Indonesia, some areas in 
Sulawesi are split equally between Christians and Muslims. 
The coastal areas of Poso district, including the town of 
Poso, are mostly Muslim while the highlands, including 
Tentena, are predominantly Christian. 
Some of Indonesia's most radical Islamic groups have 
their roots in Sulawesi, where there have also been calls for 
the imposition of strict Shari'a Islamic law. One of these 
groups is Laskar Jundullah, whose members took part in the 
1999-2001 violence. Some militants also received military-
style training in the southern Philippines. 
Sulawesi is Indonesia's key cocoa-growing region and 
important also for coffee. It is home to one the world's 
major nickel mines, PT International Nickel Indonesia, 
which is controlled by Canada's Inco Ltd. The mine lies 150 
km (95 miles) from Poso, separated by thick jungle and 
mountains. [Reuters, 30 June 2005] * 
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Conflict flares again in Central Sulawesi 
Two bombing outrages in May that resulted in the deaths of more than twenty people with more than 
twice that number injured have drawn renewed attention to the simmering conflict that has dogged 
Central Sulawesi for the past six years. 
The outrages occurred in a busy market place in the town 
of Tentena in the district of Poso, Central Sulawesi on 28 
May. The first bomb exploded shortly after eight in the 
morning as crowds of people were arriving to do their shop-
ping in the popular, traditional market. People in the vicin-
ity rushed to the scene of the explosion, either to assist the 
people who had been hit or just to see what had happened. 
However, fifteen minutes later, there was another explosion 
a short distance away, causing yet more casualties. 
Altogether twenty-two people died at the scene or later in 
hospital. The death toll was expected to rise as some of the 
injured had sustained very serious injuries. 
There has recently been a big influx of Christians into 
Tentena seeking refuge from the town of Poso some 50 kilo-
metres away. The inhabitants were panic-stricken by the 
latest explosions and started setting up guard 
posts along the roads leading into the town. 
This was the latest and by far the most 
deadly in a series of blasts which have 
occurred in Poso since the beginning of 2004. 
Two bombings occurred during 2004, one of 
which, also in a market place, resulted in six 
deaths. Besides the two bombings, there were 
several murders with the use of firearms or 
sharp implements. The perpetrators are 
described as being highly proficient, never 
missing their target. But they have come to be 
known as 'mysterious shootings' because 
none of the perpetrators have been appre-
hended. 
But in April 2005 more bombings occurred, 
followed by two in May, the second of which 
caused the largest number of casualties. 
The two bombing incidents in April which 
caused no casualties were targeted at the 
Office of Peace and Reconciliation and the 
office of the Institution for Strengthening Civil 
Society. The choice of targets strongly 
suggests that the criminals are hoping to undermine efforts 
being made to restore good relations between the Muslim 
and Christian communities in Poso. 
Divided comm unity 
Like many regions in eastern Indonesia, the district of 
Poso is inhabited by Christians and Muslims who tend to 
live separately, a situation which can be easily exploited by 
militant groups out to cause trouble. 
The conflict in Poso which first flared up in 1998 
resulted in prolonged clashes between the two communi-
ties, resulting in more than one thousand deaths, and the 
displacement of around 100,000 people. 
In December 2001, the two communities reached an 
accord called the Malino Declaration, which was brokered 
by Jusuf Kalla, now the country's vice-president. However, 
the accord led only to a short reprieve and according to local 
observers, there were no fewer than 129 recorded violations 
from the time of the Declaration up to December 2004. 
The Declaration made provision for periodic 'security 
restoration operations' while the security forces kept warn-
ing towards the end of each operation that security would 
deteriorate, as justification for more troops to be deployed. 
According to civil society groups, the Malino 
Declaration failed for a number of reasons. Firstly, it was an 
elitist accord which failed to involve the grassroots. 
Furthermore, it opened the way for lucrative projects while 
paying too little attention to the restoration of a sense of 
peace. Security has moreover become the monopoly of the 
security forces, who claimed that continued security would 
The market in Tentena in rubbles 
depend on the number of troops stationed in the region. 
Moreover, peace has not been helped by inflammatory 
statements published in the press by religious leaders from 
the two sides or by faith-based political parties. 
Commenting on the May bombings, Vice-President 
Kalla said the incidents had all the hallmarks of terrorist 
actions by Dr Azahari, a Malaysian fundamentalist leader 
who, along with Nurdin M. Top, is suspected of being 
behind several bombing outrages including the one in Bali 
in October 2002 which resulted in more than 200 deaths. 
Kalla said he was convinced that the Poso bombings were 
not the result of the conflict between the two communities 
' who were in the process of creating a humanitarian alliance 
to serve all the people in the district. 
Some observers have suggested that the explosions were 
continued on page 3 
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Suharto must be brought to justice 
They call him the 'luckiest ex-dictator' in the world, the one who got away and who will live the rest of 
his days in the com/ ort of his family home, surrounded by their ill-gotten gains. This is the man whose 
hands are stained with the blood of millions, in Indonesia and East Timor, who wrought such repres-
sion in Aceh and West Papua. Yet, the present Indonesian government saw fit to exonerate him and 
senior politicians flocked to his bedside to pay homage when he fell ill in May. This is impunity with a 
vengeance. 
News of the government's announcement to grant 
Suharto amnesty sent shock waves through the human 
rights community in Indonesia. This is the man whose New 
Order held Indonesia in its grip for 33 years, who sent his 
armed forces out to murder people and strike fear through-
out the country. As one commentator said scornfully: 'These 
people say we should forget everything. But we are talking 
about what Suharto did to the Republic. It never occurred to 
them because they are Suharto's men.' 
During the invasion of East Timor in December 1975, 
carried out on Suharto's orders, and the 24-year occupation, 
a third of the population lost their lives. This puts Suharto 
firmly in the ranks of a war criminal. Tens of thousands 
were imprisoned and whole communities were forced to 
leave their homes and resettle in strategic hamlets, under 
army surveillance. 
TAPOL calls for justice 
TAPOL responded to the government's exoneration of 
Suharto with the following statement: 
It is now seven years since General Suharto was forced 
to resign on 21 May 1998, following a wave of student 
demonstrations across the country, bringing to an end the 
bloodiest era in Indonesia's modem history. 
Suharto seized power from President Sukarno in 1965 as up 
to a million people were slaughtered by forces acting under 
Suharto's orders, in what has been acknowledged as one of 
the worst massacres of the twentieth century. The wave of 
killings engulfed Communists or alleged Communists as 
whole families were annihilated. The Communist Party and 
numerous organisations alleged to be affiliated to it were 
banned for allegedly plotting a coup against the President. 
To consolidate his power over the state, Parliament and 
the Consultative Assembly were purged and coerced into 
adopting a decree banning the teaching of Marxism-
Leninism. This decree still remains in force. 
Following the white terror against the left-wing, other 
parties were forced to merge and pledge allegiance to the 
regime. While general elections were held every five years, 
the outcome was a foregone conclusion and Suharto's tight 
grip on the state apparatus was never challenged. 
Two student movements were crushed in the 1970s and 
in 1984, hundreds of Muslims were killed in the harbour 
region of Tanjung Priok, following protests about the arrest 
of four custodians of a local mosque. The Army was also 
used to conduct a reign of terror in Aceh and West Papua 
where sentiments against rule from Jakarta have long been 
very strong. 
Under Suharto's command, hundreds of thousands of 
people were detained and held without charge or trial. 
Thousands were exiled to the island of Buru where many 
hundreds died of starvation or as a result of atrocities perpe-
trated by the troops in command of the prison island. 
Since their release, these ex-prisoners have suffered 
continued discrimination, and are today still living with the 
stigma of alleged involvement in an event known as the G-
30-S which occurred on 1 October 1965, about which they 
knew nothing. (See separate article.) 
Discrimination widespread 
While these men and women 
along with their offspring suffer 
discrimination, the man who was the 
cause of their suffering enjoys 
impunity, living a charmed life 
surrounded by his corrupt family. 
Recently, when he spent a few days in 
hospital, politicians flocked to his 
bedside, to pay homage to the former 
dictator. There was not a murmur from 
these well-wishers about the suffering 
he inflicted on so many innocent 
Indonesian men and women who were 
left to rot in prisons and concentration 
camps regardless of how old or sick 
they were. 
Demonstrations demanding that Suharto be put on trial continue 
As one former political prisoner, 
Sobron Aidit, who spent years on 
Burn, said in Jakarta: 'I won't forgive 
Suharto. Millions died because of 
him. His sword is still bloody.' 
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Suharto was also responsible for the invasion and occupa-
tion of East Timar in 1975. During the course of the occu-
pation, one third of the population died. The Indonesian 
army ruled the country with merciless disregard for the 
people and tens of thousands were driven from their homes 
and villages and held for years in prison. 
c.orr~ption charges trivialise enormity of 
his crimes 
Even today, seven years after his downfall, there have 
been no moves to bring him to justice, unlike dictators in 
other countries such as Rwanda, Cambodia, Chile or Iraq. 
The only controversy centres on whether he should be tried 
for corruption, which only trivialises the true crimes of 
which he is guilty. 
It is high time for the man who committed so many 
crimes against humanity to be brought to trial to account for 
his deeds. It is an insult to the millions of Indonesians and 
East Timorese who have suffered as a result of the crimes 
perpetrated during the Suharto era to allow this man to live 
out the rest of his life in pace and tranquillity while his 
victims still continue to suffer. 
Parrot-like praise for Suharto 
A Jakarta Post journalist recalled that shortly after 
Suharto's resignation in May 1998, the paper reported: 'Less 
than a month ago, 202 million Indonesian people called him 
President but now only his trained parrot at home (is) 
screeching: 'Good morning Pak President.' 
The bird died a few years ago but it should be pleased 
with itself for the example it set, as all his boss's four 
successors, Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati and 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono have dutifully followed the 
parrot's example. All have been very reluctant to force him 
into court to face corruption and human rights abuse allega-
tions. All of the!11 apparently believed that Suharto would 
never recover from his sickness which was used by the 
courts as a reason not to start his trial. It is as if all the pres-
idents after Suharto did not want to believe that maybe 
some day he might get better, thus dispensing with periodi-
cal medical check-ups to ascertain whether he was still sick. 
The writer, Jakarta Post columnist Kornelius Purba, said 
that Suharto, just out of hospital, will turn 84 next month, so 
'dare we disturb his peaceful life? After more than seven 
years, more and more people are lining up to say nice things 
about him.' 
He concludes that 'it is merely false hope to expect the 
current government to bring this man to justice. Even 
students have now lost their appetite for protesting against 
him, meaning that Suharto can now continue to live out his 
peaceful existence. So just what are we supposed to do with 
this old man?' [The Jakarta Post, 13 May 2005] 
New Order enjoyed US support 
But a contrary view has also been advocated. The case 
against Suharto was powerfully argued by political scientist 
Mochtar Pabotinggi: 'Even now, we have not seen the full 
damage and effect of the New Order regime, the torture and 
ruin of dozens of years under . . . Suharto.' There was no 
such thing as a fair and civilised society, with thousands 
killed without trial. 'The New Order stood so long with the 
support of the US,' he wrote. 
He had nothing but contempt for claims that Suharto 
created a united Indonesia. 'While the military claim they 
helped unite the country, 'the facts show that ..... it has been 
the military that has been breaking the nation apart .... The 
military shot and killed people who tried to fight for them-
selves, kidnapped them, made them disappear... in the 
process becoming the root of the disintegration of the 
nation.'. 
Pouring scorn on claims that Suharto's New ~rder 
brought development, he said the development projects 
'belonged to Suharto and his cronies'. 
Unfit to stand trial? 
Pabotinggi called claims by doctors that the former dicta-
tor was not fit to stand trial a 'lie'. 'How many times has he 
travelled to Nusakembangan (prison) to see his favourite 
son? How many times have we seen him walking around? 
Bring him to trial, let him talk, force him to talk.' [Jakarta 
Post, 23 May 2005] 
But many among Indonesia's elite have softened their 
views about Suharto. Ali Sadikin, a former governor of 
Jakarta and fierce critic of the dictator, was one of those to 
visit Suharto in hospital. He said Suharto should be tried to 
uphold justice but then immediately forgiven. 
One of the country's leading commentators, sociologist 
Frans Mangis-Suseno, said investigations against him 
should not stop although the results should take into account 
his achievements when ruling the country for 32 years. 
A Muslim scholar, Komaruddin Hidayat argued that if 
the government wanted to offer amnesty, it should involve 
the public . in making such a decision. But he claimed that 
negative sentiment against Suharto was apparently decreas-
ing while humanitarian emotions were 'taking sides' with 
the ailing former president. [Jakarta Post, 12 May 2005] 
The world's luckiest ex-dictator 
An Indonesian commentator pointed out that Suharto's 
admirers are still around, as are his critics. He rued the fact 
that 'a leading newspaper recently discussed the corruption 
of power and urged the public not to ignore it, yet without 
mentioning even once the man who ruthlessly and cleverly 
ruled this country for decades'. The article was titled: 'The 
luckiest ex-dictator, seven years on.' 
'Is it surprising then,' he writes, 'that Benedict R.O.G 
Anderson, a well known Indonesianist, not long after 
Suharto resigned, wondered why it is that Indonesians, after 
three decades of the authoritarian and repressive New Order 
still pay homage to their ex-dictator. As Anderson perhaps 
suggests, many Indonesians not only admire but are actually 
awestruck in dealing with the phenomenon of power like 
Suharto's. 
'This love-hate ambiguity concerning Suharto and his 
power is stunning and its consequences are perhaps most 
dramatically expressed and graphically illustrated when he, 
at the hospital, was visited by his friends and (ex) foes.' 
A.M. Fatwa, told Radio Netherlands that he felt emotionally 
deeply affected meeting the old man in his hospital bed, and 
kissed him with tears in his eyes. This is the same Fatwa 
who was sentenced by Suharto's regime to 18 years in jail 
and who now claims that he did it because of his faith. 
[Aboeprijadi Santoso in The Jakarta Post, 21 May 2005] 
No doubt Suharto is laughing up his sleeve and congrat-
ulating himself for conveniently falling ill and opening a 
floodgate of sympathy from the cream of the country's 
political elite who felt the urge to flock to his bedside. 
Along with exoneration from the government and homage 
from so many politicians, Indonesia's ruthless ex-dictator 
can feel confident that things are going his way. * 
6 TAPOL Bulletin No. 179, July 2005 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
Former political prisoners deinand justice 
There are today in Indonesia literally hundreds of thousands of people who, with their relatives and 
offspring, continue to be stigmatised because they were detained and held in prison for ten or more 
years without charge or trial, following the events of October 1965 which brought Suharto to power. 
1lthough charges were never brought, they are subject to a range of discriminatory practices, affect-
ing their lives and the lives of their families. 
Since 2003, many groups of former political pris-
oners have made representations to the country's 
National Human Rights Commission and to the DPR 
the national parliament, seeking rehabilitation and 
compensation for their unlawful arrest and detention. 
Following an event on 1 October 1965 when six 
generals and an officer were kidnapped and killed, the 
Indonesian army launched mass arrests which contin-
ued into the early months of 1966. At the same time, 
hundreds of thousands of people were slaughtered 
right across the country, in a massacre that has been 
named the worst massacre in the twentieth century. 
With the exception of a few hundred men and 
women who were brought to trial and either executed 
or given very long sentences, the rest became known 
as 'tapols' (for tahanan politik, or political prisoners). 
They were said to have been 'either directly or indi-
rectly involved in the G-30-S,' (Gerakan 30 
September or 30 September Movement, which is how 
the event on 1 October came to be known). The letters 
'PKI' were added, implying that the Indonesian 
Communist Party was responsible for the 1 October inci-
dent. Not a shred of evidence has ever been produced to 
back such a claim. This was nothing less than a ploy to 
legitimise the crackdown and annihilation of the PKI and all 
alleged associated groups. 
With the fortieth anniversary of the 1965 tragedy now 
approaching, commemoration plans are being made. But 
meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of people along with 
their families and offspring, still suffer many indignities 
because of the discriminatory laws and regulations that 
remain in force. 
Many jobs are still closed to them in sectors where they 
might 'have an influence' on other people. These include 
performing as shadow-play puppet-masters, journalists and 
priests. Their sons and daughters find their paths to educa-
tion and training courses blocked, once it is discovered that 
either of their parents was once a 1965 tapol. In many 
regions, their identity cards still bear the initials 'ET' for ex-
tapol. Under Indonesian law, all persons over the age of 60 
years are issued with identity cards for life, but this is not 
applicable for ex-tapols, who are required to seek renewal 
every five years. 
Artist challenges the law 
A retired dancer, Nani Nurani, has filed a complaint 
against her local government for refusing to issue her with 
an identity card (ID) for life. Nani was born in 1941, and 
comes from a family of classically trained musicians who 
were frequently called on to perform on prestigious occa-
sions before 1965. In December 1968, while on her way 
home, she was arrested and taken to Guntur Prison in 
Jakarta. Her military interrogators tried to force her to 
confess to involvement in the G30S because she had danced 
at a PKI event in 1965, an allegation which she strenuously 
A gathering of ex political prisoners 
denied. Nevertheless, she was detained and held without 
trial for almost eleven years, and not released until 1976. 
When she applied for an ID in January 2003 she was 
issued with a card for five years, although, being over sixty 
years old, she was entitled to one for life. However, this was 
denied her on the basis of an Interior Affairs Ministerial 
Instruction, Inmendagri No 24 1991 which denies former 
detainees this right. 
Although in July 2003 a court ordered the Koja Sub-
District head to give her an ID card for life, the local 
government is still refusing her request. The chief judge 
hearing her case said their refusal was in violation of legis-
lation protecting human rights and also represented an 
abuse of power. He also said that a decision in her favour 
could set a legal precedent for the rehabilitation of political 
detainees, as long as the decision was final. 
The case is currently under appeal. 
Rehabilitation, a Presidential prerogative 
During a recent visit to Indonesia, TAPOL's Carmel 
Budiardjo, who was herself a tapol, held without trial for 
three years, from 1968 to 1971, held meetings with former 
1965 prisoners. They spoke at length not only about their 
experiences of detention and lengthy imprisonment but also 
the problems which they and their families still encounter. 
She received a dossier of letters sent to the then 
President, Megawati Sukamoputri, by the Chief Justice on 
behalf of the Supreme Court, the chair of the National 
Human Rights Commission, and the Speaker of Parliament. 
They called upon her to bring this matter to a satisfactory 
conclusion by making a declaration of rehabilitation. In his 
letter to President Megawati dated 12 June 2003, the 
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Supreme Justice, Bagir Manan, states: ' . .. the power to 
grant rehabilitation rests not with the Supreme Court but is 
the prerogative of the President. 
However, these efforts have come to nought. Having 
failed to achieve anything to rectify what is such a legiti-
mate grievance, the '1965 victims' as they now see them-
selves, decided upon a different course of action. 
Class action 
They decided, with the assistance of the Legal Aid 
Institute, Jakarta, to file a Class Action against five 
Indonesian presidents on behalf of all the men and women 
who have since 1965 borne the stigma of being alleged 
members of the banned Indonesian Communist Party. The 
Director of the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute (LBH Jakarta), Uli 
Parulian Sihombing, announced on 9 March that this Class 
Action had been filed with the Central Jakarta district court. 
'We have filed this Action because our clients have, ever 
since 1965, been victims of allegations or stigmatisation as 
members of the PK.I and they have been deprived of any 
recognition, protection or respect of their rights as citizens. 
Their right to employment, to ownership of personal 
possessions, to education and their cultural rights have been 
violated,' he said. 
The Class Action is being filed against former Presidents 
Suharto, J.B. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati 
Sukarnoputri and the current President, Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono. 
All these rights are guaranteed under the Indonesian 
Constitution and under Law No 39/1999 on Basic Human 
East Timorese refugees 
Rights as well as under the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights. 
The Class Action is being filed because a number of the 
discriminatory laws and regulations enacted and imple-
mented by Indonesian governments since the time of 
Suharto remain in force. [The Indonesian Communist Party, 
the PK.I, was formally banned in March 1966 though its 
members and sympathisers had been the victims of 
massacres and mass arrests since October 1965 when 
Suharto took power from Indonesia's first president, 
Sukarno.] 
Sihombing said that LBH Jakarta has been authorised by 
seven organisations representing victims of PKI stigmatisa-
tion to take this Class Action. One organisation represents 
members who were compelled to give up their jobs or were 
dismissed without receiving salaries, alJowances or sever-
ance pay, another whose members were dismissed from 
state employment, the armed forces or the police without 
receiving pensions to which they were entitled; another 
whose members who had been subject to special investiga-
tion for not having 'a clean environment' and were therefore 
unable to find work. Another represents veterans entitled to 
allowances which have been denied them, while another is 
composed of people whose land or property has been 
seized. Another organisation represents persons whose 
artistic creativity had been obstructed. 
Sihombing said that an estimated twenty million people 
were victims of PKI stigmatisation including three million 
members or leaders of the PKI who were murdered, and 
seventeen million who were PKI sympathisers or admirers 
of President Sukarno, plus their children and grandchildren. 
Ecosoc discrimination 
The Class Action focuses on the principles laid down 
under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, so as to demonstrate that the persecution of 
1965-66 had an impact on the victims' economic, social and 
cultural rights as well as their political rights. 
The Action also calls on the defendants to erect monu-
ments to the victims of the 1965 massacre and calls on 
President Yudhoyono to include the history of the persecu-
tion in the national curriculum. In Lubang Buaya, which is 
where the bodies of the murdered general were taken, a 
monument depicting the October 1965 incident is still 
standing. It contains gruesome sculptured images of women 
- members of Gerwani which was banned by Suharto along 
with the PKI - defiling the bodies of the generals, despite 
the fact that such allegations were proven to be utterly false 
many years ago, 
The Class Action demands Rp 10 billion for each person 
represented by the Action and calls on the Yudhoyono 
government to set up a team to assess the damages suffered 
by each victim. 
Court hearings proceed slowly 
During her stay in Jakarta, Carmel was able to attend the 
third hearing of the case at the Central Jakarta district court. 
The public gallery was packed with survivors of the 
massacre or relatives of former prisoners. On one side of the 
court sat the immaculately-dressed lawyers of four of the 
presidents (no lawyers were in attendance for Megawati), 
on the other side sat two young lawyers dressed very casu-
ally in T-shirts. After about half an hour of wrangling about 
documents with the lawyers for both sides, the presiding-
judge postponed the hearing because the necessary docu-
ments were not yet in order. 
If one considers the culpability of the five presidents, 
then Suharto is clearly the worst offender, since all the 
discriminatory regulations were adopted during the 33 years 
of his dictatorship. The four succeeding presidents are held 
responsible for failing to lift these laws and regulations. 
Abdurrahman Wahid, know popularly as Gus Dur, who took 
power in 2001 following J.B. Habibie, was the only 
continued on page 20 
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SBY governinent: the first six Inonths 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, better known as SBY, is the first directly elected president of Indonesia 
and took office in late October 2004. Although a relative newcomer to politics, he won the two-round 
elections resoundingly, standing against President Megawati who performed woefully during her 
three-year term. Indonesian voters gave SBY a sizeable majority and want him to deal firmly with 
corruption and reverse the stalemate that has bedevilled reformasi. 
Indonesia is often described as a messy state with 
poor economic performance, a lack of good gover-
nance, widespread corruption and absence of the 
rule of law. Three changes at the top since 1998 also 
suggests that the new government can expect to face 
huge difficulties in reversing the reputation of the 
Suharto government. 
Despite this, the 2004 elections were conducted 
relatively well. For such a widely spread archipel-
ago, it was an achievement to organise voting even 
in the many isolated islands. After the election 
Indonesia was described as being the second largest 
democracy after India. More voters participated in 
these elections than in the US Presidential contest. 
Election year 2004 
2004 was a year of elections. In April 2004 parlia-
mentary elections took place for national and 
regional governments, followed by two rounds of the 
presidential election. Both of the 'old' parties, Golkar 
and PDI-P lost heavily while several new parties, PKS 
(Partai Keadilan Sejahtera) and PD (Partai Demokrat) 
picked up a lot of support. 
While new governments are usually judged after the first 
hundred days, the tsunami in December struck with devas-
tating results, and the SBY government had to act to handle 
the disaster, so it would be unfair to judge the government's 
performance up to the end of December. 
Under the circumstances, Indonesia watchers delayed 
their appraisals till SBY had been in power for six months, 
to see whether he has lived up to his promises. 
It could be argued that in a country with so many social, 
political and economic problems, nobody can ever be 
successful. SBY's presidency will certainly face an uphill 
struggle and it is with this in mind that we attempt to make 
a judgement. 
Anti-corruption drive 
Corruption is as old as the Indonesian republic. Ever since 
the transfer of sovereignty in 1949, there have been anti-
corruption drives but nothing has changed. So this was a big 
test for SBY. During the election campaign, he reiterated his 
determination to deal with this scourge. 
This went down well with the electorate and he will be 
judged on how he has succeeded in stamping out corrup-
tion. Two new agencies were set up to deal with the prob-
lem and already a few cases have been taken to court. 
The first high-ranking official to be charged in court was 
Abdullah Puteh, the governor of Aceh. SBY also took steps 
to clean his own stable, the office of the state secretary, as 
well as several departments. A big campaign is also under-
way to weed out dishonest practices within the National 
Election Commission, concerning deals for polling cards. 
Eradicating corruption in Indonesia is a tall order as it goes 
The President and Vice-President, both political heavyweights 
from top to bottom. It takes crude forms like under-the-
counter briberies as well as more sophisticated forms like 
tampering with budgets, siphoning off money from state 
corporations, stage-managing public tenders, behind-the-
scene deals regarding the appointment of top bureaucrats 
and so on. It is still too early to make an assessment. 
Perhaps halfway through SBY's term in office, it will be 
possible to say whether the President has managed to cut 
back corruption. 
No miracles in politics and economics 
Indonesia is a country with gross inequalities, where the 
gap between the haves and have-nots is huge. Despite the 
government's success in keeping inflation down and secur-
ing moderate economic growth, the country's dispossessed 
are seething with discontent while unemployment is wide-
spread. In the past decade, manufacturing has been severely 
affected by competition from low-wage countries. This 
includes not only the well-known competitors like China, 
India or Vietnam but also by small Asian countries like Laos 
and Burma. Indonesia's ability to compete is also hampered 
by what investors see as legal uncertainties. Yet restoring 
the confidence of foreign investors is crucial to the coun-
try's ability to boost economic growth .. 
Economically, Indonesia is trapped between several blocs. 
While geographically speaking, it belongs to the emerging 
East Asia bloc, which includes China and India, SBY 
realises that too close an association with this bloc could 
jeopardise ties with the US and Australia. It is no accident 
that SBY made his first foreign visits to the US and 
Australia with visits to China and India coming later. 
In the seventies, Indonesia was in a much stronger geopo-
litical position. As a major oil and gas producer and a key 
member of OPEC, Indonesia wielded a strong bargaining 
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position internationally. A special donor conference called 
IGGI, later renamed CGI, was set up to handle Indonesia's 
financial and economic needs, with the World Bank in the 
driving seat. But the World Bank's programmes along with 
the policies imposed by the IMF weren't particularly 
successful and the fundamental economic problems have 
remained unresolved. 
Garbage economy 
Nowadays, Indonesia is a net oil importer and its position 
as producer of cheap commodities has been eroded. In July, 
the government unveiled an ambitious industrial policy that 
outlines the development and growth of the country's manu-
facturing industry over the next 20 years. Ministers are 
aware that time is running out and the blueprint should have 
been designed 10 years ago when the manufacturing indus-
tries started shifting elsewhere. 
The biggest challenge will be cost competitiveness and 
creating a conducive environment, which allows businesses 
to thrive. The bottom line is the eradication of corruption 
which means that drastic reforms are needed within the 
state bureaucracy, the police and military apparatus, all of 
which are notorious for milking manufacturing industries. 
Human resources must also be improved. A well-educated 
workforce which is skilled and highly productive, is the pre-
requisite for developing new and competitive companies. 
Accounting for past human rights abuses 
The public also expects the government to continue the 
reformasi programme which is currently going nowhere, by 
cleaning up and improving the judicial system, limiting the 
role of the military in the political process, creating a 
system in which the millions of victims of the Suharto 
regime can find justice and, last but not least, building a 
humane political system where conflicts like in Aceh and 
West Papua can be settled by peaceful means. 
Human rights campaigners continue to demand account-
ability for deeds perpetrated in the past and not so distant 
past. This is proving to be an uphill struggle but investiga-
tions have been resumed on the kidnapping and torture of 
pro-democracy activists in 1998 and the killing of four 
students at Trisakti University in May 1998 as well as the 
shooting of nine demonstrators in Jakarta later that year. 
Little or no progress has been made in revealing what really 
happened during the riots and mayhem in 1998 that resulted 
in hundreds of people being killed and many women being 
raped and molested, which ultimately led to the downfall of 
the Suharto regime. 
The lack of cooperation on the part of the military is 
blatant but members of the legislature have also shown an 
unwilli,ngness to work with Komnas HAM, the National 
Commission for Human Rights. This Commission prepared 
a 1,500-page report on the 1998 riots which was submitted 
to the Attorney General's Office in September 2003. It was 
returned six months later for failing to include testimony 
from key people, including officers with responsibility for 
the abuses from the military and the police. Some of the 
most senior officers with responsibility for the riots, 
amongst them; General Wiranto who was at the time armed 
forces commander-in-chief, Lt-General Prabowo, comman-
der ofKostrad, the Strategic Reserve Troops and Lt-General 
Syafrie Syamsuddin, the Jakarta military commander aJJ 
refused to give a testimony or even answer questions. 
Even if he were of a mind to do so, SBY, a general himself 
and from the same generation as the above, lacks the 
bargaining power to force them to cooperation. The military 
as an institution has functioned as a state within the state 
since the birth of the Republic. It takes more than gentle 
persuasion for the officers to accept civilian rule. 
The peace talks on Aceh and the trauma 
of East Tim or 
Since the people in East Timar cast their vote for separa-
tion from Indonesia and became independent, people in 
Indonesia are still coping with this traumatic reality. Most 
of the military blame the civilian government of Habibie, 
the first post-Suharto government, for opening the way to a 
referendum. Many politicians and public figures share this 
view. And on top of this, many Indonesians blame interna-
tional intervention for their 'loss' of East Timar. 
The SBY government is convinced that a negotiated settle-
ment on Aceh is the only way forward, to move towards a 
lasting peace. The Helsinki talks (see separate article) prove 
more than anything else that the military solution failed 
woefully and only created hardship and devastation for the 
Acehnese. The determination to make a success of the 
Helsinki talks has upset many politicians. Many of them 
harbour the fear that internationalisation will result in Aceh 
going the same way as East Timor. As a result, there is 
strong resistance to the peace talks from the nationalist bloc 
in parliament. 
Summing up the first six months 
In many ways, the SBY government, has shown a commit-
ment to clear and transparent policies. Whether it will 
succeed is another matter. The realities on the ground are 
less favourable and, as the saying goes, politics is the art of 
the possible. On the domestic scene the government has 
taken measures against corruption and has developed a 
blueprint for the economy. On the international front, SBY 
is trying to find a niche for himself, next to other major third 
world players like China, India and Brazil. 
On the human rights front, not much has been achieved. 
The historic burden of impunity for the perpetrators has not 
been dealt with by this government. It will take determina-
tion and a huge amount of good will to end impunity. But it 
can at least be argued that SBY is moving in the right direc-
tion. * 
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UN Commission proposes international tribunal 
for East Timor 
A UN Commission of Experts has advised the UN Security Council to establish an international crim-
inal tribunal if Indonesia fails to take action towards securing accountability for serious crimes 
committed in East Timor within six months. Rights groups, including TAPOL, have welcomed the 
recommendation with reservations about giving Indonesia yet another chance to deliver justice. 
The Commission of Experts has produced a detailed and 
thorough report, which is particularly harsh in its criticism 
of the proceedings of Jakarta's ad hoc human rights court 
and expresses reservations about the Commission of Truth 
and Friendship (CTF) set up by the governments of 
Indonesia and East Timor. 
respect for relevant international standards', and were 
'undertaken at a time when there was an evident lack of 
political will to prosecute'. 
The prosecuting authorities come in for particular criti-
cism. They are described as lacking commitment, exper-
tise, experience and training and are accused of conducting 
'deficient investigations' and of 'inadequate presentation 
of inculpatory material at trial'. 
The Commission, while commending the serious 
crimes process in East Timor, says that it has 'not yet 
achieved full accountability of those who bear the great-
est responsibility', namely high-level indictees outside 
the jurisdiction. This is attributed to a number of 
factors, including a lack of resources, a lack of 
Indonesian cooperation and the General Prosecutor's 
lack of independence from the government of East 
Timor. The Commission points out that whereas 391 
persons were indicted, charges are still pending against 
339 accused who remain at large outside the jurisdic-
tion. 
CTF perpetuates impunity 
The Commission is concerned that the 
Indonesia/East Timor Commission of Truth and 
East Timorese coming home 
. . Friendship does not enjoy public support in East Timor 
photo: Elaine Briere and that its terms of reference include provisions that 
It is the second time a UN-established commission has 
proposed an international tribunal for East Timor. The 
previous recommendation was made by the International 
Commission of Inquiry for East Timor in January 2000. 
Support for an international tribunal also came from three 
UN special rapporteurs who reported in December 1999. 
The Commission of Experts was appointed in February 
2005 and tasked by UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, 
with assessing the ad hoc process in Jakarta and the serious 
crimes process involving the Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) 
and the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in Dili. It was 
required to recommend further measures so that the perpe-
trators are held accountable, justice is secured for the 
victims and the people of East Timor, and reconciliation is 
promoted. 
The members of the Commission were Justice 
Prafullachandra Bhagwati, a former chief justice of India, 
Professor Yozo Yokota of Japan, a former UN special 
rapporteur on Burma, and Ms Shaista Shameem, director of 
the Fiji human rights commission. 
Jakarta trials 'manifestly inadequate' 
The Commission concludes that the ad hoc prosecutions 
in Jakarta were · 'manifestly inadequate', showed 'scant 
contradict international standards on the denial of impunity 
for serious crimes. 
Many observers are convinced that the CTF will not 
reveal the truth about the Indonesian army's orchestrated 
destruction of East Timor nor will it contribute to the 
sustainable friendship between the peoples oflndonesia and 
East Timor [see TAPOL Bulletin No. 178, p. 17]. 
A member of an Indonesia-based NGO is quoted by the 
Commission as saying 'There are no problems at all 
between Indonesians and East Timorese, so a reconciliation 
between peoples of the two countries is not needed. The 
problem of human rights violations in East Timor does not 
lie in people-to-people relations, but lies instead with the 
TNI and its militias as the alleged perpetrators of the 
violence against the East Timorese'. 
Recommendations 
In its recommendations, the Commission says that 
Indonesia should accept support to strengthen its judicial 
and prosecutorial capacity and suggests the appointment of 
a team of Asian legal experts to provide specialist advice to 
the Office of the Attorney-General. 
It goes on to recommend a review and possible re-open-
ing of all the ad hoc cases and action by the Attorney 
General in the case of Gen (ret.) Wiranto, who was the 
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Indonesian armed forces commander-in-chief at the time, 
and seven other key Indonesian officiaJs. Indonesia should, 
it says, implement all the recommendations within six 
months from a date to be fixed by the UN Secretary-
General. 
In the event of Indonesia's failure to comply, the 
Commission proposes that the Security Council sets up an 
ad hoc international criminal tribunal through its powers 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Alternatively, it 
should use the International Criminal Court (ICC) as a vehi-
cle for investigations and prosecutions. 
TAPOL doubts the value of giving Indonesia another six 
months to deliver justice. Experience and the findings of 
the Commission itself have shown that Indonesia is politi-
cally unwilling to establish the truth of what happened in 
East Timar and to hold the perpetrators to account for their 
crimes. The establishment of the CTF is just the latest 
manifestation of this lack of political will. 
Military operations ! 
The Commission's own recommendation for the 
strengthening of the judiciary and prosecution indicates that 
Indonesia currently does not have the capacity to launch 
fresh proceedings against the leading suspects. 
In regard to the serious crimes process in East Timar, the 
Commission advises the Security Council to ensure the 
continuity of the work until the investigations, indictments, 
and prosecutions of those alleged to have committed serious 
crimes are completed. 
NGOs demand decisive action 
In a statement issued on 8 July, a coalition of East 
Timorese NGOs re-stated their belief that the responsibility 
for punishing crimes against humanity committed in East 
Timar lies with the international community and appealed 
to the Security Council to act on the Commission's report 
[http: // lists.topica . com / lists l east-
timor@igc. topica. com/read/message. html?mid=8 l J 26177 
6&sort=d&start= 15708]. 
TAPOL and other international NGOs, including the East 
Timar Association for Law, Human Rights and Justice, 
Judicial System Monitoring Programme (East Timor), 
Human Rights Working Group (Indonesia), Human Rights 
Watch International Center for Transitional Justice, 
' International Federation for East Timar, and Watch 
Indonesia! have written to the UN Secretary General 
encouraging him to support the Commission's recommen-
dations and advocating decisive action by the international 
community.[http://tapol.gn.apc.org/news/file/let050712.ht 
m] 
The organisations have said that a credible system must 
be established to monitor Indonesia's compliance in the six-
month timeframe proposed by the Commission. Given the 
weaknesses identified by the Commission, such monitoring 
should include clear standards regarding the drafting of 
indictments, the conduct of the prosecution, witness protec-
tion, and judicial training and independence. It should also 
provide for steps towards the establishment of an interna-
tional tribunal in the absence of substantive progress. 
Pre-1999 crimes must also be addressed 
TAPOL believes the Security Council should also 
address also the issue of crimes committed before 1999. 
The pattern of attacks on the civilian population of East 
Tim or started in 197 5 when Indonesia invaded the country 
and was responsible for the deaths of up to one third of the 
population - around 200,000 people. This remains one of 
worst crimes against humanity of the 20th century. It is 
therefore legally necessary and morally imperative that the 
pre-1999 crimes are also investigated and those responsible 
are held accountable. 
============================== 
* 
New Books (to be reviewed in future bulletins) 
- In the Time of Madness, Richard Lloyd Parry, 
Jonathan Cape, London, 2005. 
- Social Science and Power in Indonesia, ed. by Vedi 
Hadiz and Daniel Dhakidae, ISEAS, 2005 
- Remaking Muslim Politics, Pluralism, Contestation, 
Democratization, ed. by Robert W. Hefner, Princeton 
University Press, 2005 
- An Indonesian Frontier: Acehnese and Other 
Histories of Sumatra, Anthony Reid, Singapore 
University Press, 2005 
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Ups and downs in the Helsinki Talks 
By the end of May 2005, the talks between the Indonesian Government (GO/) and GAM (Free Aceh 
Movement) seemed to have achieved far-reaching results. After only four meetings since January, 
Indonesian officials claimed that the two sides had reached agreement on eighty per cent of the issues. 
It was even hinted that some time between 12 July and early August, a preliminary cease-fire could be 
signed. 
As it turns out, the developments were more complex than 
portrayed by the press. The Helsinki talks, as the talks 
between the GOI and GAM are known, have indeed 
proceeded quite smoothly so far. The professionalism mark-
ing the way the talks have been handled by CMI, the Crisis 
Management Institute based in Helsinki, is certainly a major 
reason for the relatively smooth progress made so far. 
The other reason was clearly the 'tsunami factor'. The 'IH=: 
devastation that struck the Acehnese deeply touched Ill 
the hearts of people in all comers of the world. 
Emergency and reconstruction became the buzzwords 
for Aceh, which was hardest hit by the disaster. But at 
the same time people also realised that Aceh was a 
region of conflict. This means that starting recon-
struction work in Aceh also means resolving the 
conflict. Former President Bill Clinton gave expres-
sion to the logic of this when he arrived in Aceh in the 
third week of May as special envoy of UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan. 
The peace efforts were clearly much more upbeat. 
Both sides showed tremendous political good will to 
pave the way for a negotiated settlement. GAM in 
particular made a fundamental compromise by enter-
ing the Helsinki talks, accepting them as being within 
the framework of the Indonesian Republic. 
Positive developments 
In the second half of May, a series of positive develop-
ments marked the conditions in Aceh. The establishment of 
BRR, the body for reconstruction and rehabilitation in 
Aceh, presented itself in a very distinct and positive way to 
the people of Aceh but also to the global community. BRR 
made a clear commitment to tackle this immense task 
together with UN bodies, governments and aid organisa-
tions from all the comers of the world. 
On 18 May the Indonesian Government announced the 
abolition of martial law. In May 2003, the province of Aceh 
had been placed under martial law. For the first year, it was 
called a state of military emergency while in he second year, 
it was under a state of civilian emergency. The lifting of 
martial law was a step towards normalising conditions in 
Aceh. It was also an important boost for the ongoing peace 
process in Aceh. 
Fourth round Helsinki Talks 
On 26 May the fourth round of talks took place in Helsinki 
between representatives of the Indonesian Government and 
GAM facilitated by CMI. A few days before the meeting 
took place, Martti Ahtissaari, a former president of Finland 
and the key person in CMI in charge of facilitating the talks, 
made a low profile visit to Jakarta to meet the Indonesian 
President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Vice President 
Jusuf Kalla. 
In the fourth round, the substantial issue of security 
arrangements, a pre-condition for a future cease fire, was on 
the agenda. As with the previous rounds, the impression 
portrayed to the outside world was that the talks had been 
proceeding in a positive and constructive atmosphere. But 
as it turned out, both sides were digging their feet deeper in 
the sand. 
Demonstrators demanding peace for Ac eh 
Self-government for Aceh 
In the earlier rounds, discussions had gone a long way 
towards finding a solution that would accommodate the 
political wishes of GAM within the context of the 
Indonesian Republic. However, on the one hand it was clear 
that GOI was not prepared to discuss the option of indepen-
dence while at the same time GAM was not prepared to 
accept the status quo in Aceh at present. 
It was clear that the two Jakarta ministers involved in the 
talks, Hamid Awaluddin and Sofyan Djalil, were given 
some room to manoeuver in the talks but it appeared as if 
the boundaries had already been set by statements emanat-
ing from government circles in Jakarta that everything 
would all be within the fold of the Indonesian Constitution. 
This led to heated debates in the Indonesian Parliament 
about what this actually means. For some Indonesian legis-
lators, the Indonesian Constitution is something fixed amd 
immutable while others others see it as a document that can 
be changed or amended as necessary. 
For GAM, the boundaries of the Helsinki talks were much 
more limited. While they had dropped their demand for 
independence, they were calling instead for far-reaching 
self-government where the Acehnese would be able to run 
their own affairs, de.spite remaining part of the Indonesian 
Republic. The status of Hong Kong and Bougainville were 
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mentioned as examples of how the GAM leadership envis-
aged what they meant by the Acehnese running their own 
affairs. 
Discussions in the second and third rounds encompassed a 
number of issues: the sharing of the economic wealth of 
Aceh, the possibility of having Acehnese parties participat-
ing in elections and finding an acceptable format for Aceh 
within the context of the Indonesian Republic. Although the 
discussions proved to be quite difficult for both sides, the 
talks took place in what was described as an amicable 
atmosphere. 
It should be explained that, in the post-Suharto era, a new 
form of decentralisation was adopted for the world's largest 
archipelago. Within this framework, the conflict areas, 
Aceh and West Papua, were both granted 'special auton-
omy'. However, GAM rejected special autonomy, known as 
NAD (Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam), favouring a form of 
self government under which most political and economic 
decisions would be in the hands of the Acehnese. 
By the end of the fourth round, the positions of the two 
sides had hardened. Jakarta seems to be unwilling to give 
more than NAD autonomy and stuck rigidly to this position 
while GAM, encouraged by the openings which had 
emerged in the previous rounds, insisted that suggestions in 
the direction of a kind of self-government should be upheld. 
Belligerent voices in parliament 
While the talks in Helsinki were taking place in an atmos-
phere of openness and good will, political developments in 
Aceh as well as in Jakarta and other parts oflndonesia were 
far from conducive. So far, the Acehnese people, still suffer-
ing from the aftermath of the tsunami, have barely been 
given the opportunity to get involved in this peace process. 
Furthermore, there is substantial hostility towards the 
peace process within the ranks of the military and wide-
spread misunderstanding and lack of information among 
members of the Indonesian Parliament in Jakarta, while the 
peace process was hardly an issue for the general public in 
Jakarta. 
The fiercest criticism has come from members from the 
overwhelmingly Java-based parties, the PDI-P and PKB. In 
their view, negotiating with rebels is seen as an act of 
humiliation while what is needed is firm military action. 
And anyway, if it was necessary to negotiate, the talks 
should take place in Jakarta. The majority of Indonesian 
politicians regard Aceh as a domestic issue and regard any 
'internationalisation' as being very dangerous. The East 
Timor case is often taken as example; once that issue had 
become international, it led ultimately to East Timor 
becoming independent. 
Informal talks 
In order to accommodate most of the hostile voices, the 
President devised a special arrangement for the Helsinki 
Talks. In order to be able to proceed, it was decided that the 
office of the Vice-President would be responsible for the 
talks. They would only become formal if agreement was 
reached. This meant that Vice-President Jusuf Kalla is now 
the person responsible for the talks while the Presidency 
and other ministries like Defence and Foreign Affairs have 
been sidelined. 
In reality, what is happening is that Jusuf Kalla provides 
feedback to the cabinet while the two government negotia-
tors are key members of the President's cabinet. He also 
receives indirect backing from Juwono Sudarsono, the 
Defence Minister, and Hasan Wirayuda, the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs. · 
But it has also become clear that important sections of the 
military are not happy with the talks. In the first two 
Helsinki meetings, Major-General Syarifu~din !ippe wa.s a 
member of the Indonesian delegation. He is still on active 
service and has held several key positions in the territorial 
structure of the Aceh military command. He had apparently 
come to the conclusion that a military solution for Aceh 
would be destructive and proposed a kind of hearts and 
minds policy. It is likely that this was why Tippe was 
chosen to attend the talks. But in the April and May sessions 
he was conspicuous by his absence. It was put around that 
he did not represent the views ofTNI officers and had there-
fore been withdrawn by the TNI leadership. 
The two key persons in TNI have not made many 
comments so far. TNI Commander-in-chief General 
Endriartono Sutarto has made some contradictory remarks 
on the negotiations but so far his remarks have not been 
destructive for the Helsinki talks. Similarly General Djoko 
Santoso, the present army chief-of-staff who has a track 
record of loyalty towards President SBY has avoided 
making controversial statements. 
But on the ground things have not changed very much. 
While the talks proceed, clashes between the TNI and GAM 
continue without let-up. Official figures published by the 
military point to a rise in the number skirmishes as well as 
the number of casualties. As usual, the TNI claims that the 
casualties are GAM combatants while GAM insists that the 
victims are predominantly Acehnese civilians. 
This strange construction of informal talks has placed a 
heavy political burden on the shoulders of Jusuf Kalla. 
Criticism from Parliament and other government bodies are 
being directed at him and so far he has defended the talks 
quite effectively. He has appeared several times before the 
First Commission of Parliament to counter the many accu-
sations and answer the many questions being raised. 
A cease fire agreement in August? 
On several occasions Vice-President Kalla had to answer 
accusations that the talks are leading nowhere by saying the 
opposite and claiming that soon an agreement would be 
signed. He hinted that the cease fire agreement could be 
signed as early as July. Looking at the complexity of the 
peace deal and taking into consideration that the conflict in 
Aceh is almost three decades old, it s rather optimistic to 
believe that everything can be resolved as early as July. 
One of the fundamental flaws so far is the absence of the 
voice of representatives of Acehnese civil society in the 
Helsinki talks. There is an urgency to broaden and deepen 
the peace process to include members of civil society organ-
isations based in Aceh as well as civil society organisations 
in Jakarta and other places in Indonesia. As said above, the 
post tsunami situation has created more favourable condi-
tions for open, substantive discussions on how to end the 
conflict in Aceh and therefore directly or indirectly 
contribute positively to the process in Helsinki. * 
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Reconstruction in Aceh beset by probleDls 
The pace of the reconstruction process in Aceh, six months after the tsunami in December, 
is going far too slowly. Any assertions to the contrary were dismissed when two of the most 
prominent men answerable for the work, Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, head of Indonesia's 
special agency for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the province (BRR), and Bill 
Clinton, UN special envoy for the tsunami, admitted recently that little progress has taken 
place to date. So why is the pace of progress so slow? 
Multiple problems are having an impact on reconstruction 
work in post-tsunami Aceh. The slow pace of reconstruction 
has been attributed to a number of factors. There is the 
problem of the infrastructure which, even before the disas-
ter, was severely damaged by thirty years of conflict. Added 
to this is the sheer scale of a disaster that left over half a 
million people in need of housing, food, healthcare, educa-
tional facilities and cross sectoral support, all of which was 
compounded by another quake in March that left another 
200,000 people dependent on external support. On top of all 
this, there is the chaotic interplay resulting from multiple, 
diverse actors flooding the province to try and meet all 
these needs. 
The major actors in the reconstruction of Aceh are the 
Indonesian government, local as well as national, interna-
tional agencies and NGOs, local NGOs and the local popu-
lation. All have to face complex 
daily and interacting realities. 
The government's capacity is r-..-a;-
doubly weak as a result of 
decades of conflict as well as the 
devastation suffered by the ~~~~~ 
infrastructure from the disaster. I! 
getting things done speedily is not the only problem. 
After over thirty years of conflict, the central and local 
government has very fragile relations with the population, 
not least because of the central government's approach to 
Aceh. The impact of the conflict on local government 
further impedes their work. Rufriadi, a local activist, said 
that the top-down approach of Jakarta has made govern-
ment officials passive and lacking in initiative. Hitherto, 
they have been used to receiving and implementing instruc-
tions so when the disaster struck, they lacked experience or 
understanding of how to run local government effectively. 
Moreover, the military has, in effect, been running the 
province since the imposition of martial law in May 2003. 
And yet government, in particular local government, is 
badly needed by the people and by those who are working 
to build a better future in post-tsunami Aceh. 
At all levels, the political, social, 
cultural and economic infra-
structure is weak because of the 
ongoing conflict. The large 
number of groups involved in 
reconstruction and rehabilitation 
means that co-ordination is a 
huge challenge that many have 
not been able to meet. Local 
humanitarian and rights activists 
confront limitations on their 
space and movement, while the 
people of Aceh have little infor-
mation about the humanitarian 
and development plans that have 
been devised for their benefit by 
all these outsiders. The central market of Banda Aceh before Tsunami struck the city 
Local government 
· The role of the government is critical, from co-ordination 
of all groups working in Aceh, to providing support for both 
the Acehnese and the many groups involved in the recon-
struction, to getting approval from the government before 
certain programmes or processes can start. But, while the 
government is the key factor, bureaucracy inevitably moves 
very slowly at the best of times, while the needs of the 
displaced population are so pressing that they ought to be 
dealt with as quickly as possible. As for the bureaucracy, 
Corruption widespread 
In addition, there are also factors as diverse as corruption, 
the very low capacity of local government as a whole, as 
well as the structural and psychological impact of the disas-
ter. This has rendered the government even less capable of 
efficiently implementing the reconstruction work. A survey 
recently conducted by Gajah Mada University ranked Aceh 
at the very top for KKN (Corruption, Collusion and 
Nepotism). The day before the tsunami hit Aceh on 26 
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December, the governor of the province, Abdullah Puteh, 
was arrested and detained on charges of corruption. 
These problems have, to some extent, been acknowledged 
by the central government. The decision to establish a 
special implementing agency called BRR with overarching 
powers for the reconstruction was one such admission. The 
appointment of Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, a man with a 
reputation as a reputable, 'clean' bureaucrat, to head the 
BRR, was a constructive attempt to limit the scope for the 
'usual' problems. The most significant departure from the 
usual way of doing things was the decision to allow him to 
report directly to the President, thus cutting out the overly 
bureaucratic approach to decision-making that characterises 
Indonesia. According to Saiful Mahdi, chair of the Aceh 
Institute, this lack of bureaucratic red tape is a critical step 
towards solving the problems afflicting Aceh. 
However, this is not to say there are no challenges ahead. 
After all, the infrastructure has suffered a double assault, 
destruction by nature, as well as destruction caused by the 
conflict. 
Corruption is certain to be one of the biggest challenges, 
because so much money is pouring into Aceh thanks to the 
international response to calls for financial assistance. One 
NGO, SAMAK. claims that some £15 million has already 
gone missing. The money cannot be accounted for in the 
government's figures. SAMAK has accused local govern-
ment officials of busying themselves in a power struggle 
rather than seriously working to rebuild Aceh. 
Moreover, the creation of a new government agency, with 
yet another line of accountability could itself create new 
problems, given the already complex and often overlapping 
power structures in Aceh. The BRR may be the lead agency 
running reconstruction in the province for the next five 
years but local government will have to follow their lead for 
clean and decisive government to have an impact. 
International role 
The international community in post-tsunami Aceh has 
been doing much needed work. Locals have welcomed 
them with open arms. While there have been banners carry-
ing angry remarks about international groups, these have 
come from militant Islamic groups, most of whom are not 
Acehnese and went to Aceh to conduct their operations with 
government permission, to 'balance' the presence of numer-
ous international agencies, many of which are Christian. 
While the international community has made an invaluable 
contribution, the principle challenge they face is how to 
improve their work with better co-ordination. Until now, 
co-ordination between the stakeholder groups has been 
poor; in some places, several groups have turned up to work 
in the same village. 
Some international programmes have been accused of 
undermining local culture. Cash-for-work programmes, for 
example, have provided Acehnese with paid work, doing 
tasks such as cleaning streets and removing rubble, may be 
doing more harm than good. While in principle it is good to 
offer Acehnese the chance to earn money, Aceh has a 
culture of gotong royong (the principle of mutual assis-
tance). Juanda, chair of People's Crisis Centre in Aceh, said 
that international NGOs need to consider whether the work 
programmes offered are simply a job or really based on the 
gotong royong principle. 
Another area in which local needs are not being suffi-
ciently considered is shelter. There are many reports of 
barracks built by the government or international NGOs 
while the Acehnese who will have to live in them have not 
been consulted. 
Ongoing conflict · . 
The ongoing conflict will also be a challenge m terms of 
a sustained international presence in the province. This does 
not come from the Acehnese, the majority of whom 
welcome them, but because of xenophobic and pseudo 
nationalist elements in Indonesia who are hostile to the idea 
of foreigners getting involved in Aceh. This can be 
described as the 'East Timor syndrome'; foreigners were 
perceived as having intervened in East Timor, with the 
result that Indonesia 'lost' Timor. The recent shooting of an 
ICRC foreign staff member is an example of the hostility 
towards international work, and the potential vulnerability 
of foreign humanitarian workers in a conflict situation. 
Local NGOs and the local population 
Local NGOs seem to be more effective in responding to 
the needs of the population. Considering their limited 
capacity and taking account of what they have managed to 
deliver, their achievements are quite impressive. The prin-
ciple challenges they face are security and a related lack of 
humanitarian space. 
Questions of space and security continue to dog Acehnese 
groups. It is not true that Aceh is now completely open and 
any humanitarian work can proceed without hindrance. 
Locations where organisations can work are limited to 
Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar. Places elsewhere are difficult 
to visit, not only logistically but also for security and 
administrative reasons. Where international groups might 
have better protection than locals due to the privileges of 
their position as foreign nationals in Aceh, local groups 
remain incredibly vulnerable. 
The other major problem for local groups is their limited 
capacity, which means that they are in need of strong 
support in some areas. This has been further exacerbated by 
the fact that some of the best Acehnese activists have 
shifted their activities to aid agencies. There are numerous 
reports of Acehnese activists leaving their organisations in 
pursuit of higher wages, job security and better records for 
their CV s by working with international agencies. 
But these are not the only problems. Perhaps the most 
difficult issue is that many tsunami survivors and 
Internally-Displaced People have inadequate information 
about programmes or policies affecting them in their area or 
how to access decision-making channels. Information that 
would allow people to make informed decisions about plans 
impacting on their lives and their future are simply not 
available. The Acehnese might very well agree with very 
controversial decisions taken by the government if the 
information helping them take that decision were made 
available to them. 
Language problem 
This is obvious in the lack of availability in local 
languages of information on what is happening in the 
reconstruction process. The vast majority of information is 
only available in English. This even applies to many 
government plans which are written exclusively in English. 
Presumably this is to meet the requirements of the many 
foreigners in Aceh but it leaves the Acehnese at a loss to 
know what is going on. Meetings between local communi-
ties or NGOs are also generally conducted in English. Some 
may see this as a trivial matter but in reality it has created a 
gulf in communication and co-operation between local and 
international humanitarian groups. * 
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Solidarity for West Papua reverberates in Asia 
For the first time in the six-year history of the International Solidarity Movement/or West Papua, soli-
darity organisations from around the world met in an Asian country. This meant that groups from 
South East Asia were much better represented than in the past. The meeting was held at the University 
of the Philippines, Manila and organised by /ID, Initiatives for International Dialogue. 
The choice of an Asian venue appears to have been seen 
as more threatening by the Indonesian authorities. Past 
meetings in Europe and in New Zealand went ahead with-
out any attempts from Jakarta to have them stopped. Not so 
this time around. 
Two days before the meeting, the Philippines Foreign 
Ministry was urged to ban it. A letter from the Indonesian 
Foreign Ministry asserted that convening such an event was 
in contravention of the Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation between ASEAN 
member states because it violated · the 
integrity of another member state. 
According to Marty Natalegawa, 
spokesman of the Indonesian Foreign 
Ministry: 'We cannot accept the conven-
ing of the conference which is seen as 
violating the integrity of the Indonesian 
Government, especially as it is being co-
organised by a state-sponsored higher 
education institution.' 
Similar complaints were made to the 
Board of the University of the 
Philippines in a letter from the Rector of 
the University of Indonesia and to the 
Speaker of the Philippines Parliament in 
a letter from the Indonesian Parliament. 
In a statement, the IID said: 'We were 
disturbed that the Indonesian 
Government tried to get the meeting 
Papuans face a bleak future . . 
One of the main speakers was Papuan act1v1st 
Dominggas Nari, from the Institute for the Empowerment 
of Women and Children who focused her attention on health 
and legal matters. 
Mortality rates among women and children have soared 
alarmingly in recent years, she said. A survey conducted by 
the Health Service for 2000 - 2001 showed that out of 
100,000 births, 1,601 
women died. The death rate 
for women in childbirth was 
particularly high in Timika, 
Biak Numor, Nabire and 
Yapen Waropen. Factors that 
contributed to this high 
mortality rate were malnu-
trition, the lack of health 
facilities, insufficient aware-
ness of the signs of labour so 
that women in labour 
reached hospitals too late, 
lack of blood and a very low 
level of health awareness. 
stopped, but we are pleased that the 1.....-_ ............ 
Philippines Government has hopefully Bonar Tigor Naipospos of SNUP (Solidaritas 
learned the lesson of East Timar, when Nasional Untuk Papua) addressing the Manilla 
The mal-functioning of 
the legal system meant that 
women were not getting 
justice. Although legal 
instruments were in place to 
protect the rights of every 
citizen, women frequently 
lost out. Recently, a woman 
who was being held in 
police custody on a charge they tried to stop a similar meeting at this meeting. 
venue from going ahead.' 
Jakarta's efforts were to no avail and the meeting went 
ahead as planned. Altogether thirteen countries were repre-
sented: Burma, East Timar, Indonesia (including Aceh), 
South Korea, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, the Philippines (includ-
ing Mindanao), Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the US, 
and from Europe, the UK and Ireland. 
However, a couple of groups who had the backing ?f the 
Indonesian authorities sought to intervene by demandmg to 
attend a meeting that was by invitation only. One gr~up 
which loitered in the lobby of the hotel on the first day, tned 
to obtain a list of the participants, 
Some of the participants remembered only too well how 
a solidarity meeting for East Timor held in ~uala L~pur 
back in the 1990s was disrupted by Indonesians. This was 
during the days of the Suharto era, but.the cha!l~~ i? regime 
in Jakarta has not diminished Indonesian sens1tlv1t1es about 
solidarity meetings being held so close to home. 
of robbery died as a result of serious maltreatment while 
under interrogation. The police officer responsible was 
subject to disciplinary measures under the code of ethics. 
Promotion was suspended for a year and a civilian court 
sentenced him to four months imprisonment. He was 
ordered to pay a fine following an agreement reached with 
the family; this is what accounted for the lenient punish-
ment. Yet, this was a grave criminal act, said Dominggas, 
which should have been punished according to the law, 
without family accords. being taken into account. 
Violence against women 
According to Dominggas, women who suffer domestic 
violence are not being accorded their rights in accordance 
with the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women, which has been 
ratified by Indonesia. There is no provision under 
Indonesian law for the enforcement of the Convention so 
violations can only be dealt with as criminal offences under 
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the Penal Code. 
When the violence is perpetrated by a civil servant or an 
ordinary citizen, it is easier to obtain a decision for the 
perpetrator to pay damages but when military personnel are 
involved, which is often the case in the more remote areas, 
little can be done since local NGOs are too scared to handle 
the case. 
According to data from Abepura Hospital, there were 
400 cases of violence against women in 2000. Figures avail-
able from the police in Jayapura for 1999 and 2000 included 
twenty deaths, 5 7 cases of torture and 24 cases of beating. 
According to the Bureau of Statistics, the projected popula-
tion increase among Papuans in 2005 is between 0.3 and 1.5 
per cent. However, this failed to take account of the fact 
that 2,500 babies have already died because of mal-nutrition 
and lack of immunisation. 
Dominggas also spoke about the prevalence of HIV/Aids 
in West Papua, where it is spreading much faster than in 
other parts of Indonesia. 
The presentation by Dominggas was full of foreboding 
for the future of the Papuan people. She said she feared that 
by the time the Papuan people won their independence, 
hardly any Papuans would be left to enjoy it. 
Patriarchal culture 
The patriarchal culture which still holds sway in West 
Papua means that the male takes all the decisions in the 
home as head of the family while women are expected not 
to cause trouble. The result is that men regard themselves as 
more powerful and do what they like towards their women-
folk whom they treat as their property. 
By and large, the laws and regulations in force fail to 
provide women with a sense of justice. While agreeing that 
some recent measures taken by the government were an 
improvement, she said it was still to early to know how they 
would turn out in practice. 
Indonesia's fears of another East Timor 
Speaking on behalf of SNUP (Solidaritas Nasional Untuk 
Papua - National Solidarity for Papua), Bonar Tigor 
Naipospos said there was much optimism about the present 
situation in Indonesia. The country now has a democrati-
cally-elected president and the press is very much freer than 
before, while the political situation appears to be stable. 
But, he said, in reality, things are rather different. He gave 
as an example the local elections to be held in June in which 
all too often the candidates have been chosen by the local 
military or are rich businessmen. 
The Indonesian government was determined not to 
repeat the mistakes that resulted in a referendum for the 
East Timorese and independence, said Naipospos. The 
government is strongly opposed to Aceh or West Papua 
seceding and will do everything possible to prevent this. It 
is trying to play on sentiments within Indonesian society, 
such as nationalism or Muslim beliefs. It is widely believed 
that East Timor had been lost as the result of an interna-
tional conspiracy and now Aceh and West Papua had 
become the targets of similar plots. 
The attempts made by Jakarta to ban this meeting were a 
manifestation of this attitude. He said that the danger of 
West Papua seceding was seen in Jakarta as being even 
greater than Aceh, because of the international support that 
has built up for Papua. Moreover, West Papua's fabulous 
natural resources were a major reason for Jakarta never to 
relinquish its control. 
Indonesia's strategy is now directed towards spl~tting 
West Papua into three provinces. One of the new pro~mc~s 
has already been created. According to NaiJ?O~J?OS, this ."'.ill 
be completed within six months and the c1v1han admm1s-
trations will be paralleled by military commands at the 
provincial, resort, district and sub-district levels. . 
Demographic change was also being promoted, with a 
constant influx of migrants from Indonesia. Already more 
than sixty per cent of the population of Jayapura are 
migrants with Papuans playing a subordinate role in the 
economy. 
New KOSTRAD division 
With regard to the role of KOS TRAD and the decision to 
form a third division for deployment in West Papua [see 
separate article], Naipospos explained that the two existing 
Kostrad divisions were both deployed in Java. One is based 
in West Java to keep a close watch on developments in the 
western regions of Indonesia, while the other is based in 
East Java to control the eastern regions. The new division 
will be based in West Papua to exert control over this vast 
region. It has already been announced that the number of 
military commands will increase, he said. 
Naipospos also drew attention to the growing interest in 
West Papua among Indonesian NGOs such as the PBHI and 
the Human Rights Working Group. He commended the 
Franciscans for devoting their presentation at the recent 
session of the UN Human Rights Commission to West 
Papua. 
Human rights situation 
Speaking for TAPOL, Carmel Budiardjo said that little 
progress had been made towards reforming the Indonesian 
armed forces (TNI). Under the new armed forces law, its 
territorial structure has been retained, allowing it to have 
military commands at every level of regional and local 
government. 
With tight control over access to West Papua, it is diffi-
cult for the national and international media to report on 
conditions there and even church leaders are facing diffi-
culties accessing areas of conflict. 
The authorities in Jakarta hold stubbornly to the principle 
of NKRI (Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia), and 
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show no sign of responding to calls from the Papuan people 
for dialogue. 
When Papuans organise peaceful demonstrations on I 
December each year by raising their own Kejora (Morning 
Star) flag, the clampdown is always life-threatening and 
harsh. Two men are facing lengthy prison sentences having 
been found guilty of sedition. (See separate article.) 
A series of bloody incidents in Wamena in 2000 follow-
ing police attacks on Papuan flag posts resulted in the 
deaths of a number of non-Papuans and many arrests. When 
a group of local leaders, who were members of the Wamena 
Panel of the Papuan Presidium Council, took steps to calm 
people down, they were arrested and later sentenced to four 
years imprisonment. 
Encroachments on tribal lands for road building without 
proper consultation are frequent. The most recent incident, 
in Puncak Jaya, in the Central Highlands, resulted in mili-
tary operations which forced thousands of villagers to aban-
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political prisoners wherever they are being held, in West 
Papua or in Indonesia. It also expressed the need for 
stronger support for West Papuan women's groups and for 
the implementation of national and international laws to 
protect West Papuan women against all forms of violence in 
the home and from the State. 
The delegates strongly condemned the decision taken by 
the Indonesian authorities to increase the number of 
Indonesian troops in West Papua, in particular the deploy-
ment of KOS TRAD (Strategic Reserve Force) troops there, 
which will bring the total number of troops in West Papua 
to 50,000. 
They expressed warm support for calls by the West 
Papuan people for their homeland to become a Land of 
Peace, in face of a decision by the Indonesian authorities for 
the militarisation of West Papua. 
Demonstration in Jayapura in January 2002 expressing their anger about the Act of 
Free Choice in 1969 
don their homes and gardens, in fear of their lives. Dozens 
of people have since died from lack of food or inadequate 
shelter. 
Military units guarding the Freeport copper-and-gold 
mine have been frequently responsible for abuses against 
local people. The British company, BP, which is now under-
taking a large-scale investment in liquefied natural gas 
extraction in Bintuni Bay, known as the Tangguh Project, 
has announced that it will not agree to any military presence 
in the vicinity of its investment. However, it is more than 
likely that the military will provoke incidents in the area, in 
order to persuade the company to change its mind. The 
company has refused to acknowledge that it will be operat-
ing in an area where human rights violations are routine. 
Access to West Papua a priority 
In the closing statement, delegates decided to step up the 
international campaign in support of the aspirations of the 
West Papuan people, with priority being given to 'open and 
unfettered access to West Papua'. Special priority will also 
be given to the international campaign for an end to all mili-
tary co-operation and arms sales to Indonesia. 
The statement called for the release of all West Papuan 
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Heavy sentences for flying a flag 
1 December is celebrated as West Papua's national day and is the occasion for peace/ ul demonstra-
tions in support of the demand for self-determination. Although an earlier president, Abdurrahman 
Wahid, showed sympathy for such actions, they are now treated with a heavy hand by the present 
administration. 
It was on 1 December 1961 that the first Papuan 
People's Congress adopted West Papua as the name 
of the country, Papua as the name of the name of the 
nation and people, the Morning Star (Bintang Kejora) 
as the flag, and the song, Hai Tanahmu, Papua, as the 
national anthem. 
After the downfall of Suharto in May 1998, it was 
possible, for a limited period, for West Papuans to use 
the greater democratic space to vent to their aspira-
tions. However, that was not the case by 2004. 
Several dozen West Papuans gathered at 
Cenderawasih University in Abepura, on the outskirts 
of the capital, Jayapura, to discuss plans to hold a 
demonstration on 1 December in support of self-
determination. A group then gathered at Trikora field 
in Abepura on 1 December and unfurled the Kejora 
flag. They were immediately set upon by police who 
pulled the flag down and arrested a number of those 
taking part. • 
While most we~e released, two m~n who were Filep Karma & Yusak Pakage at the State Court of Jayapura 
deemed to be the rmgleaders were detamed and have been 
in custody ever since. On 27 May, the two men, Philep 
Karma and Yusak Pakage, were convicted and sentenced. 
Philep was given a 15-year sentence while Yusak was given 
ten years. The sentences were far heavier than the five years 
demanded by the prosecution. In announcing his verdict, 
the presiding judge, Radiantoro, also said that Philep would 
be stripped of his status as a civil servant, as the court 
deemed him unfit to work as a state employee. 
Philep is well known for his openly defiant attitude. 
When he wears his civil servant's shirt, he always has a 
Bintang Kelora emblem attached to his lapel. 
In a statement, TAPOL vehemently condemed the 
verdicts as being totally unjustified for peaceful actions and 
called on the Indonesian authorities to release the two men 
immediately and unconditionally. 
[see http://tapol.gn.apc.org/news/files/st050531.htm.] 
It further condemned the oppressive use of penal sanc-
tions to suppress the legitimate exercise of the Papuans' 
rights to freedom of expression and assembly. 
A popular cause 
Ever since their arrest, the two men have enjoyed great 
popularity. On several occasions, before and after appearing 
in court, they were welcomed by large crowds inside and 
outside the courtroom, and were allowed to address the 
crowd before getting back into the police van. 
However, following an appearance in court on 10 May, 
the police refused to allow them to address the crowd. This 
so infuriated the people that they stood their ground and 
there were clashes with the police. Dozens of people, 
including policemen, were injured. 
The incident was shown on television and widely 
reported in the local and national press. The police were 
clearly visible brutally beating up the protesters and 
committing random acts of violence. 
These shots, beamed across the country, were a great 
embarrassment for the government and the chief of police. 
Such was the outcry that several police officers were imme-
diately dismissed for mis-handling the demonstration 
continued from page 8 
President to publicly apologise to the victims for the 
massacres as many of the perpetrators were from his own 
organisation, the Nahdlatul Ulama. He also sought to have 
Law XXV /1966 banning the teachings of Marxism-
Leninism repealed but provoked a heap of abuse and anger 
for doing so. 
In discussions with many of the victims, Carmel was told 
that Gus Dur has expressed agreement with the action and 
has also stated his willingness to appear as a witness on 
behalf of the plaintiffs. 
It remains to be seen whether President Yudhoyono has 
the political will to act on this pressing human rights prob-
lem. By issuing a rehabilitation decree, he would mitigate 
the burden of millions of fellow citizens, many of whom are 
in the declining years of their lives. The anti-Communist 
fervour that swept across Indonesia in the wake of Suharto's 
seizure of power from Sukarno has surely lost its grip. Or is 
this a gamble ~hat Yudhoyono is not prepared to take, for 
fear of unleashmg another wave of protest, such as the one 
which was provoked by Gus Dur's efforts to heal this 
wounds in Indonesian society? * 
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Military build-up threatens Land of Peace campaign 
The Indonesian military, TNI, has revealed plans to deploy 12,000 to 15,000 more troops in West Papua 
between 2005 and 2009, bringing the troop presence up to a massive 45,000 to 50,000. This alarming devel-
opment has grave implications for human rights and ejf orts to promote West Papua as a Land of Peace. 
The latest military build-up began on 2 June when West 
Papua's outgoing military commander, Major-General 
Nurdin Zainal, inaugurated a new resort or sub-regional 
military command (Korem 174) at Merauke in the south of 
the province, near the border with Papua New Guinea. 
In March, the TNI announced plans to locate a new divi-
sion of its strategic reserve command, Kostrad, in the 
province and increase the number of infantry battalions 
from three to six. The first 5,000 Kostrad troops will be 
deployed to Sarong in the west of the province, close to the 
BP Tangguh natural gas project. 
When launching Korem 174 in Merauke, Zainal stated 
that the additional command was urgently needed to opti-
mise the defence of West Papua. He said that the enhanced 
military presence would still be too small 
(see, 2 June 2005, on TNI website: 
http://www.tni.mil. id/news.php?q=dtl&id=3 I 052005130508] 
Spurious justification 
Zainal's justification for the increased militarisation of 
West Papua is entirely spurious. Indonesia's regional neigh-
bours do not represent a military threat and there is no indi-
cation that they will in the foreseeable future . It is more 
likely that the military build-up has been undertaken to 
intimidate the Papuans and crush widespread support for 
independence and to send a message to the international 
community not to interfere in West Papua~ 
Even now, the TNI is engaged in a prolonged military 
offensive in West Papua's Central Highlands, which has 
displaced thousands and claimed an unknown number of 
lives through extra-judicial killings and the starvation and 
exposure of villagers forced to flee their homes. There are 
also ongoing concerns about the link between the military 
and Laskar Jihad Islamic militants and local East Timor-
sty le militias. 
The notorious Kopassus units, also active in West Papua 
The Indonesian army has a reputation for creating violent 
incidents in order to provoke unrest, justifying its continued 
presence in West Papua in the interests of security, and rein-
forcing its control of the territory. The Papuans have shown 
remarkable restraint in the face of such provocation, but 
have suffered grievously. 
There are already 8,000 non-organic troops deployed to 
guard the Freeport copper-and-gold mine in Tembagapura. 
Although BP has said that does not want army troops to 
provide security at its Tangguh project in Bintuni Bay, close 
to Sorong, there are concerns that the army will create inci-
dents in the vicinity of the natural gas project to force the 
company to reverse its decision, or face the consequences. 
The company may be forced to acquiesce in military inter-
vention if the army creates the perception that it is the only 
institution capable of delivering security. 
The planned army build-up in West Papua is in sharp 
contrast to the calls by Papuans for their homeland to be 
made a Land of Peace. Such a powerful slogan signifies the 
degree to which Papuans have felt the oppressive presence 
of Indonesian troops. The Land of Peace campaign rejects 
the increasing militarisation of the territory. It also aims to 
provide space for political dialogue and create conditions in 
which human rights are fully protected, impunity is ended 
and proper attention is given to the economic, social and 
cultural needs of the West Papuan people. 
Aceh veteran to head military in Papua 
Since 21 June 2005, the regional military command 
based in the provincial capital Jayapura, known as Kodam 
XVII-Trikora, has been headed by Major-General George 
Toisutta. Toisutta is a veteran of Indonesia's 2003/04 
martial law offensive in Aceh during which numerous 
human rights violations were committed by the security 
forces. He also saw service in East Timor where he was 
responsible for intelligence operations and mobilising mili-
tias, and is implicated in the October 1998 Semanggi 
tragedy in Jakarta (for a detailed profile see TAPOL brief-
ing paper at: 
http://tapol.gn ape. org/reportslr05062 lwpmil. htm] 
West Papua now has four sub-regional military 
commands (Korem) and ten district commands (Kodim) 
[see above briefing paper]. A planned increase in the 
number of administrative districts (Kabupaten) - currently 
29 - means that the number of Kodim is also likely to 
increase. A new Kabupaten was established at Bintuni Bay, 
the location of the BP project, in 2003. 
Three infantry battalions (usually six to seven hundred 
men each) are currently based in Jayapura (Battalion 751), 
Sorong (752), Nabire (753). The three new battalions are 
planned for Timika (754), Merauke (755), and Wamena 
(756). A cavalry detachment will be based in Timika. 
There is also a battalion of Brirnob ('Brigade Mobil', police 
special forces renowned for their brutality) in Jayapura and 
an air force battalion (Paskasau) in Biak. 
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The Merauke battalion, which is likely to form part of the 
new Korem, has already attracted controversy. Plans to 
locate the headquarters of the battalion in the Wasur 
National Park have prompted NGOs to express concern 
about its impact on the livelihoods of local indigenous 
communities. They have already been severely affected by 
dramatic demographic changes, resulting from official 
transmigration and spontaneous migration from Indonesia. 
This has left Papuans in a minority in Merauke and other 
urban centres [See Down to Earth newsletter 65 : 17 at 
http://dte.gn.apc.org/65WAS.HTM; and 'Indigenous People 
Marginalized at Wasur National Park', Jakarta Post, 19 April 
2005]. 
The new Kostrad division will substantially increase the 
number of non-organic troops in West Papua. At present, 
Kostrad has two divisions, both of which are based in Java. 
The decision to base the new third division in Papua is a 
sign of the huge importance the TNI attaches to the need to 
increase its presence in a province so richly endowed with 
natural resources and a population seething with discontent. 
Kostrad units are highly specialised troops equipped with 
the most advanced weaponry available, who undergo espe-
cially rigorous training for combat. The decision to locate 
the new division in Sorong was, according to armed forces 
commander-in-chief, General Endriartono Sutarto, made to 
safeguard external borders and maritime zones and to facil-
itate the TNI's ability to deploy troops at short notice. When 
asked, why in Sorong, he said: 'To be closer to places which 
we consider to be in need of strengthening.' 
Military structure 
The Indonesian army has a large number of commands, 
most of which exist alongside a single province although in 
some cases they cover more than one province. These are 
known as Komando Daerah Militer or Kodam. Below the 
Kodam are resort or sub-regional military commands known 
as korem, district commands known as kodim, and sub-
district commands known as koramil. At the village level are 
non-commissioned army officers known as babinsa. 
The troops in all these commands are known as 'organic 
troops'. They are part of the regular territorial forces in the 
province, and are what might be called a standing army. The 
infantry battalions are also part of this standing army. The 
Kostrad troops are not part of the territorial structure and 
are known as 'non-organic' troops. Other 'non-organic' 
troops frequently deployed to West Papua are the feared 
Kopassus special forces, notorious for their record of abuse 
and for killing popular Papuan independence leader Theys 
Eluay in November 2001. 
The command structure duplicates the civilian govern-
ment at every level, just as it did during the Suharto era. 
This oppressive presence enables the military to exert tight 
control over the population and provides it with ample 
opportunities to conduct lucrative business activities, 
including those associated with the illegal logging of West 
Papua's rich and extensive forests .The competition for busi-
ness is likely to intensify with the increase in troop numbers. 
Independent civil authority in a conflict area such as 
West Papua is rendered virtually powerless by the shadow 
military structure. The military authority takes precedence, 
disempowering the population and preventing civil society 
from functioning properly. Although there were expecta-
tions that in the post-Suharto reformasi period, the armed 
forces would be forced to reform and disband the territorial 
commands, this has not happened. In fact, things have 
moved in the opposite direction . . 
BP makes security deal with Timor crimes 
suspect 
In another disturbing development, it has been reveal.ed 
that BP entered into an important agreement for the security 
of its controversial Tangguh liquefied natural gas project in 
West Papua with an Indonesian official charged with crimes 
against humanity in East Timor. 
Timbul Silaen was West Papua's chief of police at the 
time he signed the agreement in April 2004. He occupied 
the same position in East Timor when it was devastated by 
the Indonesian military and its militia proxies following the 
country's historic vote for independence in 1999. He was 
implicated in the East Timor violence and indicted by the 
UN-backed Serious Crimes Unit and Special Panels for 
Serious Crimes. A copy of the indictment is available at: 
http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/ indictmentspdf/EuricoGuterr 
es_CSnb03.pdf]. 
In common with hundreds of other Indonesia-based 
suspects, he failed to submit to the jurisdiction of the court, 
which prematurely ceased work in May [see separate item]. 
The nature of Silaen's alleged crimes - against East 
Timorese independence supporters - is especially relevant 
to the context of West Papua, where support for indepen-
dence is equally strong. 
The agreement he signed is a Letter of Joint Decree 
between BP and the Police in West Papua concerning 'Field 
guidelines for joint security measures within the work area 
of the Tangguh LNG project' The agreement is available on 
the BP website at: 
[http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryld= 
2012486&contentld=20185 I 6] 
The stated aim is 'to create and promote common views, 
conduct and actions to ensure that all security activities are 
performed with a high level of discipline and professional-
ism and in accordance with applicable law and human rights'. 
The agreement was only recently made public following 
pressure from civil society groups. 
TAPOL, Down to Earth and the Free West Papua 
Campaign wrote to BP accusing it of endorsing impunity in 
dealing with Silaen, of paying lip service to the human 
rights of the Papuans, and of persistently refusing to 
acknowledge the wider human rights context, in West 
Papua and Indonesia, within which it is operating The text 
of the letter is available at: 
[http://tapol.gn.apc.org/newsljiles/let050620.htm] 
In a statement, the three groups expressed disbelief at 
BP's actions: 'It defies belief that BP saw fit to negotiate the 
human rights of the Papuans with a person accused of such 
grave crimes. Although Silaen has now moved on, the 
company's willingness to deal with him casts considerable 
doubt on its commitment to corporate social responsibility 
in relation to the Tangguh project.' 
The groups have called upon BP to explain its actions 
and to answer a number of questions about its relationship 
with the former police chief. 
BP Tangguh claims to be committed to transparency, 
human rights and a community-based security strategy, 
which uses locally-recruited security guards, but many 
observers remain sceptical about ~ts ability to resist inter-
vention by the Indonesian security forces. * 
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This timely 
study, published in 
Germany, seeks to 
explain some of the 
facts about the history, 
politics, economy, 
society and cultures of 
West Papua. It is an 
important reminder 
that human rights are 
indivisible and that the 
Papuans' struggle for 
freedom is as much 
about securing respect 
for their economic, 
social and cultural 
rights (ESC rights) as 
their civil and political rights (CP rights). 
Part of the reason why the Papuans have been unable to 
effectively resist Indonesian oppression for so long is 
because they have been made to suffer enforced poverty, 
economic subjugation, poor educational attainment and 
healthcare, social and demographic changes imposed from 
the outside, and the destruction of their special identity and 
culture. 
At the root of this 'human tragedy', as Willy Mandowen 
points out, is the denial of the right to self-determination 
through the fraudulent 'Act of Free Choice' in 1969. But, as 
he says, the future of the Papuan people is not just about 
their political status, but also about meeting their daily aspi-
rations to be free from fear, injustice and the denial of their 
identity. 
Ultimately, if self-determination is to be realised in a 
meaningful way, the Papuans must attain sovereignty over 
their natural resources, which are now being rapaciously 
exploited, as well as political sovereignty. Dr Theodor 
Rathgeber, the editor of this volume, goes as far as suggest-
ing that 'the threat to people's right to self-determination 
which emanates from globalisation and weakens any kind 
of national sovereignty is, at least, of similar importance 
compared to the dominance of Indonesia'. 
While this may be arguable, it does highlight the fact that 
the Papuans will have to deal with difficult issues concern-
ing neo-colonialism and the exploitation of their resources 
by western multinationals, such as Freeport and BP, what-
ever the political status of their country. The experience of 
East Timor in this respect has not been easy since its inde-
pendence in 2002. The Indonesian occupation left the 
country bereft of a viable infrastructure and beholden to the 
requirements of international aid donors. The economy is 
unable to compete with the influx of imports, unemploy-
ment is widespread, and Australia is intent on appropriating 
oil reserves in the Timor Sea. 
The law on special autonomy has presented a particular 
dilemma for the Papuans in terms of their ESC rights. 
Many have rejected the law as a means of improving their 
situation because, for justifiable reasons, they simply do not 
trust the Indonesians and seek independence as an immedi-
ate goal. Rev. Socratez Sofyan Yoman, the head of West 
Papua's Baptist Churh, for example, has elsewhere 
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described the law as a cover for policies which perpetuate 
the misfortune and suffering of the indigenous people of 
West Papua through killings and systematic violence (See 
his paper: 'Systematic genocide of the indigenous people of 
West Papua under special autonomy', 14 May 2005.). 
Others, however, have regarded special autonomy as a 
means by which the Papuans can achieve greater control 
over their own affairs and as a step towards self-determina-
tion. In this study, Agus Sumule - a Panel member of the 
Papua People's Congress and part of the team which drafted 
the initial Papuan version of the law - sees it as a source of 
empowerment, 'a breakthrough toward enabling Papuans to 
improve their economic status'. Willy Mandowen, a 
member of the Papuan Presidium Council, although doubt-
ful about the law's implementation, says it provides 'a legal 
platform for the Papuan communities to develop their own 
institutions and rulings'. This in tum, he suggests, will help 
to build up new leadership among the indigenous Papuans. 
It is questionable, however, whether there is now much 
support left for special autonomy in West Papua. The 
mistrust and anger of the anti-autonomy Papuans has inten-
sified as a result of Indonesian attempts to split the territory 
into three or more provinces in contravention of the spirit 
and letter of the autonomy law, the emasculation of the 
Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) established under the 
autonomy law, and reports that special autonomy funds 
have been used to fund military operations. 
The Papua Customary Council (Papua Dewan Adat) has 
said that the autonomy law is no longer relevant. It has set 
a deadline for the law's implementation of 15 August 2005 
after which time it will call for the law to be returned to 
Jakarta and will urge national and international dialogue 
aimed at realising the rights of the indigenous Papuans 
(Declaration of the Third Papua Customary Council, 
Manokwari, 4 February 2005). 
The plight of the Papuans in terms of their ESC rights is 
exposed and analysed in this volume from a number of 
perspectives. Willy Mandowen reviews the recent history 
of West Papua in terms of the denial of self-determination 
and the abuse of human rights and considers future options 
especially in relation to the implementation of special 
autonomy. Siegfried Zollner, a former missionary in West 
Papua and former coordinator of the German West Papua 
Netzwerk, contributes a fascinating in-depth analysis of the 
culture of the Papuans in transition with particular reference 
to the threats posed by modernisation-Javanisation and 
discrimination. 
The editor, Dr Theo Rathgeber, a German academic and 
consultant on human rights and indigenous peoples, and 
Hermien Rumbrar, who works with the Women's Training 
and Development Centre of the Evangelical Church in 
Papua, provide briefremarks on the role of women as social 
actors in the transitional society of West Papua. Agus 
Sumule, considers the Papuans' rights over their natural 
resources and analyses the conditions of employment and 
incorrie generation in the informal sector. 
Finally, Theo van den Broek, who worked in the Catholic 
diocese of Jayapura from 1975 until 2004, latterly as direc-
tor of the Office for Justice and Peace, contributes an 
exhaustive study with useful statistical illustrations on four 
fundamental elements of Papuan social life: demography; 
governance and adminstration; education; and health. The 
volume also includes helpful appendices on Indonesia's 
economy at a glance and the economic activities of military 
continued on back page 
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forces in Indonesia. 
While the book does not include a detailed analysis of the 
opportunities and obstacles presented by the political situa-
tions in Indonesia and internationally, it does suggest that the 
Presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia 
provides a window of opportunity for dialogue on the polit-
ical status of West Papua. At the same time it cautions that 
the situation in Indonesia with respect to democracy, rule of 
law and respect for human rights will improve only gradu-
ally. One of the reasons for this is that at both the political 
and economic levels, the military still plays a crucial role. 
And, in West Papua, as the study rightly points out: 'the 
political economy of the security forces .. . and the symbiotic 
relationship they have developed with resource companies, 
most notably Freeport, have created an institutional impera-
tive for maintaining the territory as a zone of conflict'. 
The study notes the Papuans' commitment to making their 
country a 'Land of Peace' and in pursuance of this objective, 
it advocates a rights-based approach to dialogue with Jakarta 
based on Indonesia's accession to and implementation of the 
international covenants on CP and ESC rights. This would, 
it argues, provide a legal and political platform for uphold-
ing the rights of the poor and excluded people of West Papua 
and enable them to participate in economic, social and polit-
ical decision-making which directly affects them. 
The international aspect of the West Papua problem is not 
merely of historic importance but also of vital importance 
today, says the study: 'Beyond the debate on the historic fail-
ures of the international community in the 1960s, there is a 
human rights-based obligation and responsibility of interna-
tional bodies to make their means and measures available to 
the Papuan people in favour of a peaceful conflict-resolu-
tion' . The implementation of the international covenants 
should be overseen by the appropriate mechanisms of the 
UN. Other international and UN-based bodies, such as 
WHO and UNICEF, could provide a range of necessary 
expertise and technical assistance, suggests the study. The 
need to strengthen the capacity of self-organisation of the 
Papuan people and its intstitution-building must also be 
addressed, it says. It remains to be seen whether this 
approach will help the Papuans realise a new future free 
from oppression and pauperisation, but the authors should be 
thanked for providing new information, insights and ideas, 
which may one day help to break the cruel deadlock. 
Published by The Evangelical Church in the Rhineland, 
2005, ISBN: 3-932735-98-6 
West Papua: The 
struggle for peace 
and justice 
Also deserving 
of special thanks is Fr 
Neles Tebay who has 
produced an excellent 
32-page overview of 
the suffering of the 
Papuan people for the 
Comment series of the 
Catholic Institute for 
International Relations, 
CIIR. 
Neles Tebay is a 
Papuan priest and journalist currently undertaking PhD 
research at the Pontifical Urban University in Rome. He 
describes the outrageous injustices experienced by the 
Papuan people at the hands of the international c~m~uni~ 
when they were denied the right to self-determmat10n m 
the 1960s and since then under a series of Indonesian 
miltary operations aimed at eradicating support for inde-
pendence. He warns that the survival of i~digen~us 
Papuans is under threat from a number of factors mcludmg 
human rights violations, the denial of Papuan culture, 
poverty and the influx of Indonesian migrants. 
Neles Tebay reviews Indonesia's recent policies towards 
West Papua - including its handling of special autonomy 
and its systematic campaign to destabilise the territory -
and the international community's approach, primarily 
determined by economic interests. 
Despite the fact that they have suffered grievously at the 
hands of the Indonesian military, the Papuans have shown 
remarkable restraint in the face of intense provocation. 
Even now, they are intent on responding to violence and 
oppression by peace-building intiatives associated with the 
campaign to make West Papua a 'Land of Peace' . This is 
described in the final section of the Comment, which ends 
with a series of recommendations addressed to the 
Indonesian government and the international community. 
An afterword explains CIIR's position on West Papua. 
This booklet wiH be a valuable source of information 
and inspiration both for those new to the issue of West 
Papua and for experienced advocates and activists working 
for lasting peace in a forgotten country. 
















Girocheques and Eurocheques are welcome. 
TAPOL's Giro account No. 33 338 3281 
Please NO Australian, Canadian or US personal cheques to UK 
Australian subscribers may pay in A$ to: 
TAPOL (Australia) 
PO Box 121, Clifton Hill, Vic 3068 
Rates for Individuals A$45, Unwaged A$22, Institutions A$80 
Dutch subscribers may pay in Euros to 
S.L. Liem 
Binnenkadijk 267, 1018 ZG Amsterdam 
Postbank 4637291 
Rates for Individuals E 25, Unwaged E 12,50, Institutions E 36,50 
Kindly state the payment is for TAPOL subscription 
Canadian and 1lS subscribers may pay in C$ or US$ to: 
TAPOL (Canada) 
PO Box 562, Station P, Toronto M5S 2Tl 
:· Rate for individuals $35, Unwaged $18, Institutions $70 
All other subscriptions and all correspondence to: 
TAPOL, 111 Northwood Road, Thornton Heath, Surrey CR7 8HW, UK. 
Tel: +44 (0)20 8771 2904, Fax: +44 (0)20 8653 0322 
email: tapol@gn.apc.org, website: http://tapol.gn.apc.org 
PLEASE NOTE: DONATIONS AND STANDING ORDERS 
ARE ALWAYS WELCOME 
